This essay attempts to offer an understanding of social capital networks that accounts for both continuity and change in network structures and relationships. The embedded politics approach views inter-firm networks as socially and politically constructed. That is, while firm level actors may develop tenacious socio-economic relationships, the authority structure of a network, which governs dispute resolutions and the distribution of resources, emerges from the ways certain constituent firms align themselves with public institutions. I empirically examine this approach relative to more traditional views by analyzing the transformation of Czech industrial networks during the current period political and economic reform. The Czech Republic provided apparently supporting evidence for several mainstream approaches to reform and networks. Yet on closer inspection we find instability and significant change in industrial networks. The fragility, eventual stability, and subsequent changes in networks come not from purely "intranetwork" factors, but rather from specific policies the government pursued. In short, this essay aims to renew our focus on the origin and evolution of social capital and networks by bringing politics back into the forefront.
For more than a decade scholars of economic sociology, organizational theory, business strategy, and political economy have found great purchase in the related concepts of social capital and socio-economic networks. 1 While much of the debate centers on the ways in which the substance and structure of certain interactions between individuals (e.g., firms and persons) constrain and enable action, it tends to view social capital and networks as static. That is, firms are either embedded in certain patterns of ties or they are not. And if they are, then the set of norms and resource distribution constituent of the inherited socio-economic relationships can be stably reproduced and determine the strategies and governance rules in subsequent time periods.
This essay attempts to offer an understanding of networks that accounts for both continuity and change in network structures and relationships. The extant approaches lead to static views of networks since they largely take socio -economic relationships as prior to and independent of the political-institutional setting. In turn, networks are largely self-governing, since the attendant norms, power structures, and resource distribution comes mainly from repeated interactions and a deep history among the member firms themselves. In contrast, the embedded politics approach offered here understands inter -firm networks as socially and politically constructed. That is, while firm level actors may develop tenacious socio-economic relationships, the authority structure of a network, which governs dispute resolutions and the distribution of resources, emerges from the ways certain constituent firms align themselves with public institutions.
Consider for a moment how scholars have applied the concepts of social capital and networks to the growing debate on economic and institutional development. First, scholars tend to conclude that societies or groups of firms that are embedded in rich networks and endowed with longstanding relationships will be able to grow and innovate more than those without such ties. ) Second, when societies undertake political and economic transformations, pre-existing network relationships should be stably reproduced and largely determine not only the strategic choices of actors but also the new institutional rules governing economic activity (Spenner et al. 1998 , Ostrom 1995 . For instance, in his seminal work on post-communist transformations in East-Central Europe, David Stark and his collaborators argued that Czech economic gains during the 1990s came from the ability of firms and banks to reproduce their past norms of reciprocity via interlocking ownership ties housed in newly created investment funds. (Stark and Bruszt 1998, Stark 1996) Distributional and resource dependency theorists have argued that actors with certain str uctural positions that afford them asymmetric control over information and resources will be able to reproduce their positions in the following period as well as have disproportional influence on the new governance rules for their own benefit. (Knight 1992 , Ostrom 1995 , Barney 1985 In this view, then Czech networks would also have been able to be stably reproduced, since the now famous rapid mass privatization scheme via vouchers appeared to allow to give insiders significant immediate advantage over outsiders in terms of information and privatization project approval. (Allio, et al. 1997 In short, the Czech Republic can be seen as a transforming society where socio-economic networks would be stably reproduced. Moreover, the mass privatization model was to be beneficial for restructuring. For network theorists, it kept the norms of reciprocity largely intact and thus provide the grounds for cooperation among economic actors to "recombine assets"
under high uncertainty. For property rights theorists, rapid mass privatization and the immediate establishment of laws protecting creditors and owners would allow inter-linked actors to utilize contractual and ownership methods of dispute resolution to cooperate and restructure firms in socially productive ways. (Boycko et al. 1995 , World Bank 1996 Yet by the late nineties, its capital markets had collapsed under the weight of investment fund mismanagement and self -dealing. Restructuring advanced in questionable ways as industrial production sank below that of its post -communist neighbors, Hungary and Poland, and could not recover to even 1990 levels. Moreover, despite the attempts by Czech firms to reproduce their industrial networks, the latter appeared highly unstable and ungovernable.
These developments should cause one to reevaluate our understanding of embeddedness.
This essay will do so by examining in detail the evolution of two leading Czech industrial networks during and after the fall of communism -an evolution where both continuity and change are present. These two networks were flagships of Czech industry during the 20 th Century and were viewed even by the Wall Street Journal (1996) as the future corporate leaders political institutions played prominent roles. (Piore and Sabel 1984 , Saxenian 1994 , Locke 1995 , Herrigel 1996 I.
Networks and Social Capital Under Communism
In the 1980s, scholars called for an effort to "bring society back" into the study communism to capture the diversity among regimes and the changes taking place within political and economic structures. (Stark and Nee, 1989) The civil society literature boomed, as it showed how different social groups were introducing cultural and religious traditions into overtly communist controlled organizations. (Ekiert 1991 , Ekiert and Kubik 1999 , Glenn 2001 , and Howard 2002 Economic sociologists made great headway showing how the failures of central planning and the shortage environment led managers and workers to develop flexible modes of production organization. That is, within the rigid planning structures of mid-level planning associations and large firms, firm and plant managers as well as certain work teams formed horizontal ties with one another to informally adapt production to gain supplies and retrofit poor quality parts. (Burawoy 1985 , Stark 1986 , Voskamp and Wittke 1991 These tendencies increased as central planners delegated increasing management responsibilities to firm managers and regional party officials.
In communist Czechoslovakia, similar patterns of network formation could also be found, namely within industrial associations (VHJs) -meso-level planning structures that managed particular industrial sectors. (McDermott 2002) VHJs integrated firms with related production to increase technological synergies and decrease the number of unfilled interfirm orders. As VHJ directorates gained greater responsibility to guide production, member firms and plants gained greater independence from the central organs of the state. Given this autonomy, cons tituent customers and suppliers, managers and work teams forged direct informal ties and rules to adapt production to the exigencies of plan failure and shortage. VHJ networks were also similar Stark's Hungarian networks in that under they sought to achieve autarky and limit the problem of shortage. Constituent firms and plants developed broad production profiles of final and intermediate products and forged tight inter-unit technical and economic links as sub-contractors and collaborators in R&D.
Notice that if our characterization of industrial networks stopped here, the emphasis would be that firms had built socio-economic ties that became rather autonomous from the political environment. (Grabher and Stark, 1997) These ties would largely dictate future forms of organization and strategy and the inculcated informal rules and ones position in the network would directly translate into how intra-network decision would be made. In this light, Stark argued that after the collapse of communism and its formal planning institutions, the reproduction of network ties provided constituent firms with reliable channels of resources and information as well as norms of reciprocity to help "recombine" assets in a variety of ways. (Stark 1996, Stark and Bruszt 1998) Short of an outright assault on civil society by the state, politics has little room to change these dynamics. Causality runs from the micro to the macro.
However, a closer examination of industrial networks reveals that political factors were endogenous to network creation, forcing us to consider how macro-political conflicts over future institutional design changes interact with intra-network adaptation. (McDermott, Ch. 2, 2002) Communist regimes had created three parallel planning structures -one for the economy in which organizations like VHJs were crucial, a second for the management finances through which state bank regional branches provided working capital and investment credits, and a third for territorial administration, a system of subnational councils to manage political and socialwelfare matters. These structures overlapped in different ways but with VHJs as the nexus points. For instance, councils influenced the selection of top managers and such assets as housing, health and vocational training centers, and cultural facilities were often on the books of the firms and VHJs. Thus while VHJs gained greater responsibilities, territorial administrative reforms brought social-welfare and training matters under the co-management of VHJ managers and regional Party officials. Thus a symbiotic relationship emerged as managers and council officials formed alliances to gain resources without increasing central intervention and to develop informal rules of economic governance for the respective region. Similarly, as VHJs gained more autonomy over their finances, the bank branches were increasingly tied directly local firms as they (and not the state budget) became principal the providers of credit and capital and worked with regional councils to help limit the growth in inter-firm debt in the 1980s while not damaging the welfare of their respective locale.
This characterization of industrial networks, in turn, leads us to view firms as being embedded in socio-political networks. It is characteristic not only of communist Czechoslovakia but also reflected in research on the ex-GDR, USSR, and even Hungary itself. 2 Moreover, this view reflects the characterization of West European and US industrial districts, from which much modern network analysis emanated. (Piore and Sabel 1984 , Herrigel 1996 , Locke 1995 , Saxenian 1994 The basic idea here is that constituent suppliers, customers, managers and work groups formed alliances with local state bank branches and party councils to gain privileges from the state center and create informal channels of coordination to adjust to the uncertainties of the shortage economy. For the purpose of this article these alliances are critical variables since they solidified the network authority structure. They were sources of political and financial risk sharing to limit central intervention and facilitate the autarky and improvisation needed to adapt to an ineffective planning structure.
The importance of the alliances becomes immediately apparent when we try to distinguish different types of networks and how they evolved during communism. respectively by the VHJs Skoda and TST. Within their respective VHJs, the networks differed in their production traditions, nodes of power, and distribution of decision-making rights, even though both VHJs had the same legal organizational form (a koncern). Within Skoda, there were several heavy engineering production programs, such as locomotives, power plant equipment, heavy machinery, forged steel parts, and gearboxes. Firms and plants were incorporated as both final producers and mutual sub-contractors. Decision making for production and finances was centralized at the level of the directorate, which set the framework for lower level bargaining among members and overtly favored certain members' production needs over those of other members. Within TST, member machine tool producers had fewer sub-contracting links between themselves, collaborating only on certain parts and the R&D conducted by two member firms. Decision-making was decentralized, with member firms keeping their own financial accounts and running the directorate largely through consensus.
A key reason for these structural differences was variation in the ways that certain member firms forged alliances directly with the administrative councils and indirectly with corresponding bank branches. For instance, the firm, Skoda Plzen, dominated the directorate of Skoda VHJ. This grew out of the alliance Skoda Plzen forged with the powerful regional council of Western Bohemia. This allowed Skoda Plzen top management to control all channels outside of the VHJ to other government actors and VHJs and to the banking system, such that when even large apparently strong firms, like in nuclear power equipment, were incorporated into the VHJ, the new firm's managers took orders from a turbine plant of Skoda Plzen. In TST, most member firms developed direct links to regional bank branches and regional/district administrativecommunist party councils. These linkages aided firms in managing inter -firm debts, mediated delivery disputes with non-TST firms in the region, and were sources of countervailing bargaining power vis-à-vis one another, the TST directorate, and the central state ministries.
The durability of these different authority structures and the impact of the firm-council alliances on network reproduction could be seen even when the state dissolved the VHJ system in the late 1980s. The motivation of the dissolution was to reduce the industrial concentration and create more, smaller newly designated and independent state owned firms. Yet Skoda and TST reacted differently, not simply due to their socio-economic ties but also because of the differences in the distribution of power and patterns of alliances. Skoda's reaction was similar to VHJs in steel, trucks, and aircraft manufacturing and was reflected in the actual decrease in the number and increase in employment in Czech engineering firms. After two large member firms in Moravia and southern Bohemia fought to become independent, the regional and city councils aided Skoda Plzen to convert the remaining member firms of the old VHJ, including a large industrial import-export firm, into its own plants, which it alone vertically commanded. Plants would have no legal powers, no individual accounts, while the head office kept control of, among other things, foreign trade relations, R&D, and credit links to the state commercial banks.
The contrasting form of network reproduction that TST pursued was also found in electronics, pump manufacturing, and chemical sectors. With the aid of their already decentralized financial accounts and their relevant regional and district councils, TST firms pushed to become separate, independent state owned firms, with all attendant rights and privileges. Yet because each firm lacked financial strength and direct foreign trade experience, the firms again called on the aid of their political ties and collectively bargained with the state to have the former directorate of TST (and with it the corresponding personnel, building and resources) become their "own" voluntary branch association, which they all would control.
The critical point here is that the authority structures of the networks, and thus distribution of power and resource control between members, grew out of the relationships certain managers had largely with subnational political actors. The importance of the politicalinstitutional architecture supporting different types of networks will be thrown into sharper relief when we try to identify factors of continuity and change during the current period of transformation. If we were to believe purely distributional and sociological theories of social capital and embeddedness, then the network structures depicted in Figures 1 and 2 should be stably reproduced. Whether the choice of restructuring strategy is by the force of fiat or compromise and consensus, it would be the direct product of existing patterns of resource control and norms of reciprocity that emerge solely from inter-firm relationships. Yet if we believe that firms are embedded in socio -political networks, then the continuity in group cohesion and the distribution of power is more fragile. The power a firm or plant may have over assets and the creation of formal and informal rules of inter-firm relations is derived from not only one's position in the value -chain, such as a critical supplier or purchaser, but also the strength of one's ties to local public actors, such as bank and party-council officials during communism.
Alterations in the authority structure of a network emerge from both changes in the economic environment, like the relative importance of a particular product, and changes in the politicalinstitutional environment, like the re-organization of the central and sub-national governments, privatization rules and financial regulations. The politics surrounding the way in which a society develops new institutional designs could significantly impact the stability and patterns of network reproduction.
II. Revolution and Reproduction
By the early 1990s the Czech Republic was viewed as a crowning success of implementing a depoliticization strategy. (Boycko et al. 1995, Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994) 4 Surveys showed that the lack of new sources of sales, inputs, and financing led firms and plants to work with their few existing suppliers and customers to gain resources and reorganize production.
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The pr iority of rapid privatization with limited government intervention provided also an opportunity for managers to try to maintain control over the firm. Since the program depended on the submission of projects by management and a limited time frame for government review, managers could gain autonomy by becoming joint-stock companies to be privatized partially or wholly through vouchers. Surveys revealed that managers expected that the broad dispersion of voucher owners, in the mid-term at least, would help them to increase their own decision-making powers but provide little aid to improve the health of the firm and gain investment. In the meantime, managers sought direct foreign investment through JVs, the legal decision-making powers for which rested with the company and not the state. 6 Although the privatization law allowed for projects by outsiders and the use of multiple methods, aggregate analyses of approved projects, voucher bidding, and ownership data all confirm the preference given to projects from incumbent management, the lack of information by external actors, and the broad use of vouchers and JVs by Czech managers.
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As we will now see, these general tendencies can be confirmed through closer analysis of the industrial networks discussed above. Members of hierarchical and polycentric networks, respectively, chose distinctly different strategies of privatization while intra-network subcontracting was reinforced. However, as we will also see, instability in network reproduction began to emerge due to the way privatization policy in particular, and the depoliticization agenda in general, altered the authority structures of existing networks.
For members of a hierarchical network, like Skoda Plzen, the tight internal economic links and turbulent financial conditions offered good reasons to remain unified. But for many units privatization also meant an opportunity for independent control over sales, production and revenues. During the dissolution of VHJs in 1987-88, a similar debate about fundamental organizational changes arose within the above-mentioned former VHJs, but top managers quickly consolidated the VHJs into single unified firms with the aid of conservative regional councils and their control of channels to ministerial subsidies and state bank credits. In 1990 the legal and political environment changed. Top management could no longer monopolize external channels and thus lost much of their authority. Regional councils were dissolved with no replacement, the planning system was disassembled, ministries were diluted of resources, and the new state banks were reluctant to lend. Plants and units also had the right to submit their own privatization projects to the government.
Members within the hierarchical network appeared to strike an initial compromise: to privatize the group as a whole in the form of holding, combining the use of voucher and foreign partners. (See Table 2 .) The holding structure allowed a diffusion of authority and a sharing of common resources, while mangers would explore further legal, organizational, and production changes. Units would become subsidiaries or divisions, with decision-making power over production changes and new independent financial accounts. The holding would become an "internal, regulated market," providing critical resources each lack on its own: financing and mutual subsidization through internal credit, strategic management for common production programs, foreign trade and partnership contacts, and shared labor and production facilities. As the holding provided medium-term financial protection, members, collectively or individually, would formulate restructuring strategies and find foreign partners to gain needed investment, market niches, and know-how. The central idea was that while managers used new sales revenue and investment to pay off existing debts, they would decide over the future role of the holding, including spin-offs, break ups, closures, and the inclusion of foreign strategic investors.
Members of a polycentric network, like the ex-TST VHJ, chose distinctly different privatization strategies that built on their earlier efforts to further decentralization but support group cohesion. In 1990-91 and in the face of the dissolution of regional councils, the weakening of district councils, strict banking laws, and rapid privatization, the ex-TST firms ISB, whose engineering fund bought strategic stakes in SST member firms and important suppliers/customers. 8 The result of this elaborate equity and financial alliance can be seen in Figure 3 . Member firms would renew past direct ties with one another owned, and via SST have a collective brokerage link outside the group. While member firms owned SST, SST ran the boards of Strojimport and the engineering fund, provided strategic information to its members, and aided members in negotiations with banks, notably via Banka Bohemia.
At first glance, we can see that the old networks patterns were durable. Despite having similar technologies, aggregate employment, end markets and being subject to the same laws, policies and trade union (Kovo), the members of the ex-Skoda and the ex-TST VHJ networks chose different privatization strategies and initial organizational forms. Moreover, both groups were conscious about the importance maintaining cohesion, by using holding structures and associations that would be supported by new private external partners, such as through FDI JVs and a local investment network. To the extent that networks are more or less self-governing entities, then any future conflicts over restructuring would be resolved by the continuity of preexisting power distribution and norms of reciprocity. Moreover, the Czech ability to rapidly privatize and establish the requisite legal regime offered network actors the additional dispute resolution tools of contracts and ownership.
But if one fast-forwards the story a few years, we that while pre-existing inter-firm and inter-unit relationships would distinctively structure the ensuing patterns of restructuring conflicts, the use of old social ties, contracts, and equity were insufficient. For holding companies like Skoda, were unable to resolve collective decisions about how new asset boundaries would be drawn, new rights distributed, liabilities divided, and investment directed.
By 1992-93, virtually all the prospective JVs between foreign partners and holdings collapsed.
By 1995, the SST network had fragmented and most firms bordered on insolvency. For members of both groups the attempt to preserve their past social relationships, reinforce them with new governance mechanisms of equity and contracts, and also replace past public external partners with new private ones did little to promote cooperation and restructuring. In the end, the central government would have to step in to mediate internal disputes and provide financial support for
restructuring. An indeed, by the mid to late 1990s the pre -existing network structures would be reversed for each. The previously hierarchical structure of Skoda would end up with a significantly weaker central office and fiercely independent member firms. The previously polycentric structure of TST/SST would end up with a single strong member firm that owned several others and controlled the rest via its hold over the association headquarters, subcontracting, and ava ilable credit.
III. The Limits of Continuity -The conflict over network restructuring
To understand more clearly why pre-existing network relationships could continue to shape strategy but fail to resolve key restructuring decisions and eventually give rise to radical changes in network structures we need to identify how the forces of continuity and change confront one another. On the one hand, industrial networks confronted the apparent contradictions of reinforcing existing production and financial ties and of reorganizing the network structure itself.
On the other hand, while the depoliticization agenda of the Czech government offered network 
Reinforced linkages and disharmony in Skoda
Conflicts emerged in Skoda from the contradiction between the reinforcement of inter-unit production and financial links and the multiple restructuring experiments pursued by members.
If the inherited scope and flexibilities were clear sources for unit autonomy, the overlapping supply links with relatively narrow technical specifications constrained individual discretion.
Intra-holding sub-contracting links remained vital for the flow of production across different common programs as well as those of individual units. The importance of these internal links, however, varied according to one's place in the network. In turn, managers held different views over production interdependencies, which provoked clashes over such critical restructuring issues as asset control, spin-offs, new sub-groups, and plant closings.
By 1989, the production profile of Skoda Plzen accounted for 91 different product groups across more than 20 plants. 9 While the main final production programs included transport (electric locomotives and trolleybuses), energy equipment and systems (nuclear and steam turbines), and heavy industrial machinery, upstream production included gearboxes, transmissions, engines, generators, transformers, electrical control systems, forgings and presses, and rolled steel and castings. An aggregate analysis of its output and supply structure indicates that units were already less dependent on the group for sales, but were highly dependent on one another for inputs and parts. 10 Production data shows that between 1991 and 1993 inputs from outside the group dropped significantly when compared to the previous 5 years, suggesting an even greater tendency for Skoda units to turn toward one another for inputs when hit by the new uncertainties. 11 These trends created three essential problems in the reorganization of production and decision-making rights.
First, although many units faced strong incentives to increase their independence from the group, such actions threatened their own and joint production programs. Critical upstream suppliers, such as those for gearboxes and transmissions, large forged metal parts, industrial transformers and generators, and automated injection, rectifier, and traction control systems, all had both the experience and capability to increase their focus on external sales and split from the group. Yet these plants still supplied unique parts for both the above mentioned main production programs and smaller programs of other plants. Greater independence could seriously impede the flow of production and product development. Moreover, these plants still depended on members of the holding for the supply of 20-45% of needed inputs as well as services, such as energy, marketing, procurement, and maintenance.
Second, the scope of plant level production and density of multiple production links The binding force of existing production links was reinforced by the heightened financial distress of manufacturing firms that was typical of transforming economies in the region. The undercapitalized Czech industrial firms generally reacted to the sudden and persistent drop in sales and liquidity by sharply increasing inter-firm debt through existing networks 12 and acquiring short-term bank loans. For holdings, the collapse of payments for in-process production to the former communist countries filtered from end-producers to internal suppliers, and the groups became dependent on the banks for operating capital. But the inherited economic links and the choice to privatize the group as a whole shaped the growth in commercial and bank debt of holdings in two distinctive ways. First, units utilized their inherited ties and the umbrella of the holding to hold down costs and negotiate more flexible terms of inter-unit payment. In turn, continued intra-holding sub-contracting but also deepened the financial interdependence among members. Second, the practice of cross-colla teralization within holdings tied the financial problems of one unit directly to more prosperous units. Given their weak capital base and limited legal position, members depended on the holding center to acquire loans for working capital. In doing so, the holding securitized old and new loans by using valuable assets of a certain unit as collateral for loans used by other units. 13 In turn, the autonomy of a potentially strong unit to reorganize production, spin-off, or create its own JV was severely constrained.
Any attempt at gaining independent financing or regaining control over its assets was now intimately connected to the solvency and reorganization of other, usually more distressed, members.
With growing financial entanglements, holding members were increasingly constrained in their decisions to downsize and spin-off. On the one hand, many critical upstream units in holdings had become legally insolvent, but were not easily replaceable with external contractors. 14 In turn, holding management continued to cross-subsidize them. On the other hand, the negative experiences of several self-liberated and previously profitable plants restrained the ambitions of holding units to spin -off. 15 The new firms quickly lost production and financial aid of the ir former cohorts, failed to connect with expected foreign partners, and languished alone in insolvency. By early 1992, several even requested to be reabsorbed in the holdings. 16 Their failures were stark reminders to holding members that production and financial conflicts could easily end by one of the partners walking away, leaving the other to bear the new economic uncertainties alone. Indeed, statistical analysis of privatization shows a very small number of industrial spin-offs, which also performed significantly worse than their former parents.
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The internal conflicts within holdings became amplified for two reasons. First, members increasingly pursued, individually and in small groups, multiple organizational and production experiments. The aim was to develop new or modify existing products to penetrate new markets and generate cash flow. Indeed, this process of decentralized experimentation was at the core of compromise upon which holdings were created. Yet due the mutual subcontracting links, taking an experiment to its next level demanded that a collaborating unit or firm reduce the priority of its own experiment. Under the high uncertainty that existed in transforming economies, no member had the capital or could give the guarantees to force the hand of or instill confidence in another.
Second, the Klausians' depoliticization approach toward institutional change had radically altered the authority structure of old network and not provided sufficient alternatives to resolve such disputes. On the one hand, Czech policy efforts to centralize power effectively had eliminated a critical source of socio-political power and order. As probing began to foster potentially conflicting strategies and change the position of units within the group, the authority structure of the group was thrown into question: how should new boundaries around assets be drawn and who had the rights to decide them? Under the former hierarchical network, a key firm supported by the regional council possessed the political and social resources to aid a resolution to conflicts --be it by force or compromise. After 1989, no such actor was around. The dissolution of regional councils and the weakening of district and municipal councils eliminated a source of power for some members and a source of external resources and mediation for the group as a whole. Indeed, the aggregate and holdings data on privatization show that firms solicited the aid of local municipalities by offering them free transfers of significant equity stakes. 18 The impact of depoliticization and the macro-politics of institutional reform on undermining network reproduction and reorganization is amplified when one considers the string of JV failures (see Table 2 ). If the Czech depoliticization strategy had eliminated a traditional external partner for the holding companies, it also held out the promise of providing a new one, albeit in the form of a private actor --a foreign direct investor. Privatization policy created a clear incentive structure for foreign investors to purchase whole or parts of assets and inject needed resources into firms. A foreign partner may not have held the local socio-political capital that former councils once did, but it surely held an international reputation, technical know-how, and financial capital, which were in short supply among domestic actors. Indeed the compromise that created the holding structure also produced privatization strategies based heavily on gaining foreign direct investors. The principle vehicle for this was the JV, and not complete buyouts for three reasons.
First, given the Klausian's aversion to having the state involved in the ex-ante restructuring and financial support typical of FDI, it promoted vouchers. Once a firm had significant equity in voucher privatization, the firm, but not the state, was the main bargaining partner and financial recipient of the foreign investor. Second, managers embraced this as it allowed them maintain control of their firms. With the remaining equity as enticement for strategic investors, using a JV allowed holding management to gain markets, know-how, and finances without dismantling their current production and organizational experiments. Third, foreign investors viewed taking over a complete, highly leveraged holding as very risky. They were interested mainly in a sub-group of the holding units.
JVs were not, however, contracts for a specific project, but rather fragile agreements about the future control and use of assets. As the foreign partner invested money into the operations over time, Czech managers would have to agree to certain restructuring steps and the relinquishment of majority control over the assets in question and thus the remaining holding equity. But because foreigners feared their investment would be used to finance the debt and restructuring of non-JV units, they sought independent commitments to isolate the JV-units from the other units. 19 With their inherited production and financial interdependencies and their alr eady fractious internal relations, Czech managers saw such commitments as a threat to non-JV units and the former VHJ network itself. Unable to reach an accord to finalize the deal, both sides turned to the government for mediation and assistance with certain financial and environmental liabilities. The first major JV of this sort was between Skoda and Siemens and was viewed at the time to be the bell weather for future FDI. With Czech privatization rules already restricting government intervention into deals that did not contain outright sales by and revenues to the state, such participation was tantamount to revising Czech privatization policy and the clear roles of government organs. 20 The Klausians saw this as an invitation for protracted government intervention and capture by private interests, and thus antithetical to their designs.
As they gained increasing political power and control over policy from late 1991 through their victory in the June 1992 parliamentary elections, the Klausians blocked efforts by the Minister of Industry to allow the government to become a financial and negotiating partner.
After the elections, the Minister of Industry was ousted and the talks with Siemens collapsed. In the following September, Skoda's management board resigned and the holding shut down three major units and defaulted on its loans.
Fragmentation in SST
As discussed above, SST firms were poised in 1990-91 to join the growing trend in machine tool firms becoming paradigmatic examples of SME creation and flexible specialization.
(See Acs and Audretsch 1990 , Acs, Audretsch and Carlsson 1991 , Piore and Sabel 1984 , and Herrigel 1996 .) While their decades of experience, polycentric structure, embrace of privatization all pointed to ideal conditions for becoming an entrepreneurial and adaptive network (Larson 1992 ), SST's new supporting investment alliances would provide crucial finance and information (refer again to Figure 3 ). By 1995, however, the machine-tool network had fragmented and most firms bordered on insolvency. The attempt by SST members to preserve their past social relationships, reinforce them with new governance mechanisms of equity and contracts, and also replace past public external partners with new private financial ones did little to promote cooperation and restructuring.
As with other Czech industrial firms, SST firms were hit hard by the collapse of trade to former communist countries (CMEA), the domestic recession, and tight monetary policy. Unlike members of the hierarchical networks, the ex-TST firms were not as tightly vertically linked but more horizontally associated. For instance, a firm typically focused on a certain class of machines, had several plants, and produced over 80% of its inputs in-house. While parts like hydraulics, pneumatics, and ball bearings, as well as specific metal castings, came from other members, the firms acquired certain electronic components from other VHJs jointly via the TST directorate or directly, depending on the quality of their local professional linkages and their ties with regional councils. But under the new economic uncertainties, SST members faced the contradictory forces of renewing production links with one another to reduce in-house costs and of pursuing often multiple production experiments to gain new markets and cash flow.
As each firm began to experiment with new products or alterations of existing ones, they turned to one another for the development or sub-contracting of certain components and the cost sharing of exporting and importing (especially for CNC electronics). Since these experiments were highly uncertain and often conflicted with one another, no firm could give the guarantees to the others to forego their own plans and invest in those of the solicitor. For instance, SST firms sought new market niches based on short pilot production runs. Even when the solicitor demonstrated that the trial runs were for a credible international client, these runs were often too short with poorly defined future revenue streams to instill confidence in other members to prioritize their own component production for the given project. Experimentation had also led member firms often to encroach on one another's product lines in such a way that had firms fearing that collaboration would undermine individual export revenues. 21 Intra-network investment and production conflicts were not new to SST firms. In the past, disputes over new products, outsourcing, and internal segmentation of final and intermediate goods were settled via the directorate and namely the countervailing bargaining certain members had from their respective alliances with the regional and district councils. With these councils gone, the supporting equity alliances were to provide needed financing to overcome the hold -up problems among members. Yet this strategy failed due to similar problems previously discussed with the use of contracts and the attempts by holding to create JVs.
As one of the "big-five" Czech banks, CSOB was the critical financial link in the alliance.
Yet even with the government's partial recapitalization and debt-relief for the banks, the collapse of CMEA trade left CSOB and Strojimport, the foreign trade house, with large stocks of nonperforming credits and weak capital bases. CSOB, in turn, refused to initiate the restructuring of Strojimport and provide credit lines to Banka Bohemia and SST firms. Given the tight interdependencies between the banks and industrial firms, the big Czech banks found it too risky to lead bankruptcies or finance restructur ing via the available governance mechanisms of contracts, liquidations, and ownership (debt-equity swaps), and SST firms languished. Indeed, in 1994, four of the five largest de novo banks, including Banka Bohemia, were seized by regulators and closed.
IV. Reconstituting Order in Networks
As suggested throughout this essay, network stability is largely a product of the authority structure, which itself emerges from the different types of power certain member firms gain from a society's political-institutional environment. This point should be very familiar to students of not only industrial districts, as previously mentioned, but also those of technology change and political Clearly a political system with more decentralized power and with more pragmatism may be more responsive to network needs and experimental in its approach to institution building. Yet typically the greater the centralization of power and the more ideologically slanted the coalition, strong systemic crises are needed to trigger a response. For instance, it took the Great Depression in the United States to finally move the federal government to begin experimenting with a variety of institutions that can both facilitate and adequately govern workouts and the socialization of the risks of firm creation and innovation, such as Chapter 11, Fannie Mae, and the numerous programs supporting small firms and technology change.
As we will now see, for the Czech Republic flexibility in depoliticization would only come from the threat of systemic crises. New network structures would emerge through the interaction of the timing and mode of government re -engagement with that state in which the network found itself at the moment of despair.
Stabilizing Skoda
The shut down and default of Skoda in September 1992 triggered an immediate response from the reluctant Klausians. Given the size of holdings and the close interdependencies between industrial firms and the few main Czech banks, Skoda's collapse threatened to bring down the banking system and damage whole sectors and regions. Skoda in turn became the first case for
Klausians to support negotiated restructurings and a model for its future engagement with other holdings.
The trial and error experiment in government backed restructuring started with a simple attempt to use tenders incentive contracts with the remaining Skoda but ended with a multi-level governance structure that both limited self-dealing and altered the authority structure of the existing network. In short, the government through the initial tender chose two delegates: a team of exSkoda managers, Nero, and a consortium of Skoda's two largest creditor banks, KB and IB. The incentives were that the parties could receive significant equity stakes in the holding at prices to be determined over time. Also the government would absorb some of the old large debts that came up in the Siemens negotiations.
At the same time the government required the parties not only to undertake certain restructuring actions but also to effect significant changes in the balance of power within the holding. To avoid getting entangled in restructuring details it was unfit to judge but to also ens ure collaboration and governance of all the parties involved, the government combined the tools of delegation and deliberation. On the one hand, the government delegated to Skoda's new In many ways, this structure resembled public-private workout institutions in advanced developed nations. The government was providing partial financial assistance to give the parties breathing space to negotiate and explore reorganization options. It was using public power to enable certain actors to undertake changes. It was monitoring them through both incentives and iterative, disciplined deliberations about their actions. Linking the delegation of authority with general agreements on compensation and risk sharing forces the parties to demonstrate concrete results and difficulties in meeting them. In doing so, the parties reveal information to one another about their intentions and points of further negotiation and problem solving. They monitor one another as well as trade control rights and responsibilities. 22 For instance, as Skoda's Center allowed the subsidiaries greater decision-making rights and direct access to material and financial resources, the government clarified the share prices and debt relief. As the banks provided alternative forms of refinancing and operating credits, the government clarified the banks' compensation and the Center ceded valuable assets as debt collateral.
In facilitating such gradual sharing of rights and risks, delegation and deliberation had two important impacts on Skoda. First, the combination stabilized the once reeling network by facilitating a multi-level experiment in which participants learned how to monitor and cooperate with one another. Just as the government, banks, and Skoda's Center had to learn to reveal their vulnerabilities and create new common goals and strategies, so too had must Skoda's Center, the banks, and the subsidiaries learn to share risks and asset control to devise new production possibilities. By 1995, Skoda's debt had fallen to 50% of its 1992 level, revenues had increased over 50%, and employment was increasing significantly. Skoda's rebound was even recognized by independent observers such as the stock market, the international business media (Economist,
The Wall Street Journal, and Balkan News International), 23 and international banks, that would go on to finance new Skoda ventures.
Second, the workout and monitoring mechanisms forced a radical change in the authority structure of Skoda. The holding that grew out of a hierarchically commanded network was now very decentralized. Key decisions were reached through collaboration not fiat. No longer did a single member monopolize outside economic and political channels. Rather, government oversight and the monitoring triangles empowered subsidiaries by granting them greater legal rights and giving them the space to develop greater operational autonomy and stronger direct links with outside banks, clients, and suppliers.
Stabilization of SST Through State-backed Domination
In contrast to Skoda and other holdings, the struggle among SST firms festered for several years more. Part of this was due simply to the smaller size of more geographically dispersed and independent firms and relatedly to the fact that virtually all of the equity of most member firms had been privatized. In turn, the lack of a major and sudden economic impact on the country as well the lack of equity on the government books, kept the SST situation off the radar screen of the central state. But the other part was a product of depoliticization -the government was dismantling its radar screen. With the apparent stability of holdings and banks and new political turbulence within his coalition in the beginning of 1996, Klaus continued to block reforms for subnational governments, bankruptcy, and capital markets, and diminished the operational discretion of the central agencies involved in the restructuring of holdings. This pushed key SST members toward imposing network order on their own.
Without credible structures for negotiated management of common assets and liabilities, the next best options for a firm are to forego collaboration, vertically integrate needed assets, and, ultimately, resort to financial manipulation. Between 1992 and 1995, ZPS, the most successful SST member, more than doubled its total sales and exports by redesigning several of its final and semifinished products and often selling them at or below cost to gain market share. ZPS had cultivated a network of former employees of the regional council, ZPS, and big banks that helped the firm access new export markets and gain financing and strategic information via a set of allied, medium-sized investment funds and banks. This new network, referred to locally as the "Zlin Mafia," had at its core ZPS, the independent and rapidly growing investment fund PPF, and a newly found but also rapidly growing bank, Pragobanka. Managers from all three sat on each other's boards. As SST relationships fragmented, ZPS found it too risky to engage its initial strategy of gradually spinning off certain plants and utilizing other SST firms for sub-contracting. Instead, ZPS sought to impose its own order over the network and acquire other SST firms by mid 1995. The question, of course, was how would they obtain control of the other firms, given that the big five Czech banks and the dominant investment funds had proven useless as sources of direct financing.
The answer is that a well-placed network can be used for self-dealing and domination as easily as it can be used for collaborative production. The turning point toward domination and increased instability becomes apparent when one puts Burt's "brokerage" concept in a politicalinstitutional setting. ZPS generated its advantageous "brokerage" position by leveraging its participation in SST with its conscious efforts to rebuild and convert its own local socio-political network into a source of sales and financing. These actions were sufficient for ZPS to restructure itself and begin new lines of potentially lucrative products. Yet, brokerage is a two-way profession and depends still on the integration of supporting public institutions. On the one hand, the broker needs a reasonably stable core network (SST) to put existing assets and information to new uses without taking full responsibility for them. On the other hand, as the core network collapses and total control becomes paramount to the broker's entrepreneurial aspirations, the broker (ZPS) demands ever more resources to consolidate its position (and avoid default). Local public actors could no longer participate, as they lacked resources and a political framework to coordinate actions with other SST localities or the central ministries. Moreover, without institutionalized mechanisms to encourage existing financiers to share the risk in the broker's consolidation, the broker's private Ultimately, however, such a scheme can lead to systemic failure, when the state can no longer ignore the damage. Just as ZPS was attempting to complete its conquest with the acquisition of two more SST firms that were only partially privatized and PPF was battling the main Czech banks in 1996, the regulator s seized one of their allied banks, declared an emergency at the Czech Insurance Company, and placed Pragobanka on a watch list. The domination strategy for the broker had reached back into the heart of the public domain.
But the government's hand was much weaker than when it intervened into Skoda. First, both ZPS and PPF were already closely involved in Pragobanka, and PPF was a new board member of Czech Insurance. Second, from the government's point of view PPF and ZPS were becoming leading entreprene urial firms. They were not going to give the firms a free ride, but engagement and negotiation with them over restructuring of Czech Insurance and control over the other SST firms seemed the quickest way to stabilize the financial system and the machine tool sector. PPF was eventually allowed to obtain 20% of Czech Insurance and run its investment funds. PPF and ZPS shared control of the board of Pragobanka with one of the main Czech banks. ZPS completed the purchase of a key division of another SST firm. And ZPS and its friends at the SST directorate were soon invited to propose strategies for the Ministry of Industry. Third, given that government held no more equity in ZPS and almost all SST firms, bargaining leverage and resources for the involved state agencies (such as those involved in Skoda previously) could come only from new policy initiatives. But as mentioned above, by early 1996 political infighting within Klaus's coalition and pending general elections led Klaus to declare that privatization was completed and to reconsolidate his party's control over the relevant economic agencies and ministries. Effectively the state's negotiating partners with ZPS and PPF had virtually no discretion.
In turn, the Czech government's delayed and weak response to the crisis effectively reinforced the Zlin Mafia's control over SST. (See Figure 5 .) The once polycentric structure of ex-TST firms now looked very hierarchical. Where there was once consensus decision making there was power and fiat of a much more powerful ZPS.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
This essay has argued for a more political constructionist approach to understanding how networks and social capital are reproduced and can change over time. Since extent approaches view structural and relationa l variables as being prior to and virtually autonomous of the politicalinstitutional environment, networks and social capital appear largely self -governing and static.
The industrial networks examined in the essay indeed were imbued with long histories, strong socio-economic ties, and specific distributions of resource control. They were also subject to the same laws and unions and similar technologies and economic shocks. Yet, as we saw, these networks were not self -governing -historical socio-economic ties, repeated interactions, and the use of contracts and ownership were insufficient to help network firms and plants resolve restructuring conflicts and gain investment.
In pointing out these deficiencies, the aim of the essay was to discard simply structural and relational variables, but rather to marry them with political-institutional variables so as to more clearly gauge the factors of continuity and change. On the one hand, the social and economic ties of the respective networks clearly had impacts on the organizational and privatization strategies during The epilogue to these cases reinforces the arguments about the impacts of the distribution of public power and the development of public-institutions to support workouts on the stability of network restructuring. As mentioned above, by the beginning of 1996, Klaus began to face intracoalition instability and pending parliamentary elections. To consolidate his hold on power, he declared victory for mass privatization and no need for further institutional adaptation as well as curtailed the discretionary power of the central ministries and agencies that not only were under the control of other coalition parties but also were the principal public actors engaged in new initiatives that began with the Skoda intervention. On the one hand, as the government withdrew from Skoda and other holdings, it simply left them to be governed by the same capital markets and bankruptcy rules that had hindered restructuring in the first place. On the other hand, no new institutional policies were pursued to promote workouts, effective investor protection and accountability, FDI, and exports. In turn, firms like Nero, which was the manager-owner group running the center of Skoda, and ZPS were left in a poor governance and regulatory regime and resorted to undertaking dubious investments. In the wake of the 1997-98 Asian and Russian crises, both Skoda and ZPS became virtually insolvent. Creditors of both firms tried and failed for a year to form voluntary standstill agreements to reorganize the assets. In 1999, Skoda, ZPS and several holdings entered into a new public-private restructuring and reprivatization agency that was created by the newly formed social-democratic government.
In many ways, the argument presented here reflects a recent current in economic-sociology and political economy. For instance, Guillen (2001) In my embedded politics approach the issues of power and link between institutions and networks are a bit more explicit. First, not only is the distribution of public power critical to the formation and change of inter-networks, but also the ability of public actors to create bargaining resources is vital from them to affect change in any productive way. A great difference between the interventions at Skoda and SST was that the government had with Skoda financial resources that it could use both as incentives and leverage to force actors to reveal information and trade control rights over time.
Second, the evidence suggests that sustainable adaptation for networks requires an approach to institutional transformation as an experimental process. Just as network firms are experimenting with forms of organization, investment and product development, so too would public actors need to experiment with optimal forms of risk sharing, monitoring, and bargaining leverage. In turn, depoliticization not only can undermine the existing authority structure of networks, but it can also undermine the institutional adaptation to facilitate network reorganization.
In sum, this essay points to new areas of research on the origins and evolution of social capital and networks. To begin with, researchers should try to identify how the authority structures and informal rules of networks emanate from specific institutional supports and public policy. From there, one can examine network change in two ways. One is to examine how existing institutional and political variables inhibit and enhance network adaptation to external technological and economic shocks. The other is to analyze how different political approaches to institutional reform impact the stability and adaptation of the economic networks themselves. • FNM and ZPS negotiate purchase of outstanding shares of Kurim, Hostivar, ZPS, and Kovosvit still in FNM.
•MPO, ZPS, and SST discuss new policies for sector.
Banks, ZPS, Pragobanka, and SST firms attempt financial restructuring.
ZPS, SST's Fund, and PPF create ownership coalition over several firms.
